01735    a2200169   4500999001700000020001800017082001900035100002100054100002200075245008500097260004800182504003300230520105800263650009101321942001201412952014101424  c26111d26111  a9781108408530  a338.922bJEN-I  aJensen Nathan M.  aMalesky J. Edmund  aIncentives to Panderb: how politicians use corporate welfare for political gain  bCambridge University Pressc2019aCambridge  aInclude Reference and Index
  apolicies targeting individual companies for economic development incentives, such as tax holidays and abatements, are generally seen as inefficient, economically costly, and distortionary. Despite this evidence, politicians still choose to use these policies to claim credit for attracting investment. Thus, while fiscal incentives are economically inefficient, they pose an effective pandering strategy for politicians. Using original surveys of voters in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom, as well as data on incentive use by politicians in the US, Vietnam and Russia, this book provides compelling evidence for the use of fiscal incentives for political gain and shows how such pandering appears to be associated with growing economic inequality. As national and subnational governments surrender valuable tax revenue to attract businesses in the vain hope of long-term economic growth, they are left with fiscal shortfalls that have been filled through regressive sales taxes, police fines and penalties, and cuts to public education.  aProductionvGovernment policyvTax incentivesvTax creditsvCorporationszUnited State  2ddccBK  00104070aNASSDOCbNASSDOCd2020-06-29eOPg1584.92i2020-06-11l0o338.922 JEN-Ip50881r2020-07-13 00:00:00v2171.13w2020-06-11yBK